This essay considers biotrophic cyst and root‐knot nematodes in relation to their biology, host–parasite interactions and molecular genetics. These nematodes have to face the biological consequences of the physical constraints imposed by the soil environment in which they live while their hosts inhabit both above and below ground environments. The two groups of nematodes appear to have adopted radically different solutions to these problems with the result that one group is a host specialist and reproduces sexually while the other has (...) an enormous host range and reproduces by mitotic parthenogenesis. We consider what is known about the modes of parasitism used by these nematodes and how it relates to their host range, including the surprising finding that parasitism genes in both nematode groups have been recruited from bacteria. The nuclear and mitochondrial genomes of these two nematode groups are very different and we consider how these findings relate to the biology of the organisms. BioEssays 30:249–259, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1 Aims and Purposes -- 2 The Beginnings of Historical Consciousness -- 3 Historical Consciousness in the Modern Age -- 4 Philosophy of History: Speculative Approaches -- 5 Philosophy of History: Analytical Approaches -- 6 Reading, Writing, and Research -- 7 Professional History in Recent Times -- Postscript: Culture Wars and Postmodernism.

A higher order potential analysis of moral status clarifies the issues that divide Human Being Theorists who oppose embryo research from Person Theorists who favor embryo research. Higher order potential personhood is transitive if it is active, identity preserving and morally relevant. If the transition from the Second Order Potential of the embryo to the First Order Potential of an infant is transitive, opponents of embryo research make a powerful case for the moral status of the embryo. If it is (...) intransitive, then the Person Theorist can draw lines between levels of moral status that permit embryo research to proceed. (shrink)

In theory, physicians subscribe to and in their actions personify a set of virtues whose performance demands personal engagement. At the same time, they are instructed in their professional roles to remain emotionally and personally distant from those they are called to treat. The result, the authors argue, is an ethical conflict whose nature is described through an analysis of two narratives drawn from an online blog for young physicians. Confusion over professional responsibilities and personal roles were found to affect (...) physicians' perceptions of their clinical duties and their social roles. In addition, it sets in sharp relief contemporary debates on physician training and the ethical nature of medical professionalism. Practically, the authors suggest, the confusion may contribute to early physician burnout. Methodologically, this paper promotes the use of online discussion sites as rich repositories providing an insight into real dilemmas and the actual perception of physicians' attempts to address them. It thus promotes use of such sites as a resource in which assumptions about physicians' own perceptions about the nature of their role in contemporary society can be tested. (shrink)

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and (...) that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain. (shrink)

One of the most influential of the Victorian philosophers, Henry Sidgwick also made important contributions to fields such as economics, political theory, and classics. An active champion of higher education for women, he founded Cambridge's Newnham College in 1871. He attended Rugby School and then Trinity College, Cambridge, where he remained his whole career. In 1859 he took up a lectureship in classics, and held this post for ten years. In 1869, he moved to a lectureship in moral philosophy, the (...) subject where he left his greatest mark. Published posthumously in 1902, this work is Sidgwick's expository critique of the leading schools of thought that had emerged to rival his philosophy of utilitarianism, which he had presented previously in his masterpiece The Methods of Ethics. (shrink)

In ethics, it is commonly supposed that we have both positive duties and negative duties, things we ought to do and things we ought not to do. Given the many parallels between ethics and epistemology, we might suppose that the same is true in epistemology, and that we have both positive epistemic duties and negative epistemic duties. I argue that this is false; that is, that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive ones. There are things that we ought (...) not to believe, but there is nothing that we ought to believe, on purely epistemic grounds. I also consider why the parallels between ethics and epistemology break down at this particular point, suggesting that it is due to what I call the infinite justificational ‘fecundity’ of perceptual and propositional evidence. (shrink)

The somatic integration definition of life is familiar from the debate on the determination of death, with some bioethicists arguing that it supports brain death while others argue that some brain‐dead bodies exhibit sufficient somatic integration for biological life. I argue that on either interpretation, the somatic integration definition of life implies that neither the preimplantation embryo nor the postimplantation embryo meet the somatic integration threshold condition for organismal human life. The earliest point at which a somatic integration determination of (...) life could be made would be the beginning of the fetal stage, 9 weeks postfertilization. Bioethical implications are considered, specifically with respect to the moral status of the postimplantation embryo in embryo research and abortion. (shrink)

The chief goal of this dissertation is to attain some clarity with respect to the interconnected issues which constitute the problem of personal identity. The logical and linguistic categories developed by Saul Kripke provide the tools through which these issues can be separated and put into perspective. In the first two chapters I examine the modal and other semantic features of rigid singular terms and such rigid predicates as natural kind terms. I defend both the transworld identity of named individuals (...) and the real essence of genuine natural kinds. ;In the third chapter this linguistic framework is used to explicate the distinction between the numerical identity of individuals and the qualitative identity of properties. I suggest that individual identity consists in a principle of uniqueness typically supplied through indexical identification and a principle of individuation through which a given individual can be tracked through qualitative change. Property identity is explicated as a form of qualitative similarity. ;In the final two chapters I consider personal identity as a form of individual identity and personal identity as a form of property identity. I reject the former interpretation on the grounds that 'person' fails to supply a principle of individuation for actual persons. I adopt the latter interpretation and suggest that person designates a necessary dispositional property of actual persons. I consider alternative theories of personal identity from the standpoint of a property identity theory of personal identity and I argue that the property identity theory provides a compelling account of a series of widely discussed problem cases. (shrink)

In response to concerns with existing procedures for measuring strategic control over implicit knowledge in artificial grammar learning , we introduce a more stringent measurement procedure. After two separate training blocks which each consisted of letter strings derived from a different grammar, participants either judged the grammaticality of novel letter strings with respect to only one of these two grammars , or had the target grammar varying randomly from trial to trial which required a higher degree of conscious flexible control. (...) Random variation in the colour and font of letters was introduced to disguise the nature of the rule and reduce explicit learning. Strategic control was observed both in the pure-block and mixed-block conditions, and even among participants who did not realise the rule was based on letter identity. This indicated detailed strategic control in the absence of explicit learning. (shrink)

Moral status ascribes equal obligations and rights to individuals on the basis of membership in a protected group. Substance change is an event that results in the origin or cessation of individuals who may be members of groups with equal moral status. In this paper, two substance changes that affect the moral status of human embryos are identified. The first substance change begins with fertilization and ends with the formation of the blastocyst, a biological individual with moral status comparable to (...) that ascribed to human organs. The second substance change begins at implantation and ends late in embryological development with the formation of the human body, an organism with moral status as a human being. The bioethical implications of each substance change are explored. The Two Substance Change theory is contrasted with continuity theories, which recognize no substance change in embryological development and with fertilization-only substance change theories. (shrink)

Nietzsche is undoubtedly one of the most original and influential thinkers in the history of philosophy. With ideas such as the overman, will to power, the eternal recurrence, and perspectivism, Nietzsche challenges us to reconceive how it is that we know and understand the world, and what it means to be a human being. Further, in his works, he not only grapples with previous great philosophers and their ideas, but he also calls into question and redefines what it means to (...) do philosophy. Nietzsche and the Philosophers for the first time sets out to examine explicitly Nietzsche’s relationship to his most important predecessors. This anthology includes essays by many of the leading Nietzsche scholars, including Keith Ansell-Pearson, Daniel Conway, Tracy B. Strong, Gary Shapiro, Babette Babich, Mark Anderson, and Paul S. Loeb. These excellent writers discuss Nietzsche’s engagement with such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Socrates, Hume, Schopenhauer, Emerson, Rousseau, and the Buddha. Anyone interested in Nietzsche or the history of philosophy generally will find much of great interest in this volume. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Film Noir explores philosophical themes and ideas inherent in classic noir and neo-noir films, establishing connections to diverse thinkers ...

Traditional utilitarianism, when applied, implies a surprising prediction about the future, viz., that all experience of pleasure and pain must end once and for all, or infinitely dwindle. Not only is this implication surprising, it should render utilitarianism unacceptable to persons who hold any of the following theses: that evaluative propositions may not imply descriptive, factual propositions; that evaluative propositions may not imply contingent factual propositions about the future; that there will always exist beings who experience pleasure or pain.

If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative frameworks with their associated (...) clusters of general event memory and episodic memory. Multiples exhibit erratic behavior because they cannot access reliably the intersecting autobiographical memory schemata that permit graceful transitions between social roles, behavioral repertoire and emotional dispositions. Selves, in both normal and certain pathological cases, are best understood as semi-fictional narratives created by human animals to serve their social, emotional and physical needs. (shrink)

Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of 'program explanation' as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative (...) claim is inadequate, and that he has, in spite of himself, identified a promising defence of moral realism. (shrink)

Direct reprogramming of human skin cells makes available a source of pluripotent stem cells without the perceived evil of embryo destruction, but the advent of such a powerful biotechnology entangles stem cell research in other forms of moral complicity. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) research had its origins in human embryonic stem cell research and the projected biomedical applications of iPS cells almost certainly will require more embryonic stem cell research. Policies that inhibit iPSC research in order to avoid moral (...) complicity are themselves complicit in preventable harms to patients. Moral complicity may be unavoidable, but a Blue Ribbon Panel charged with assessing the need for additional embryonic stem cell lines may ease a transition from embryonic stem cell research to clinical applications of iPS cells. (shrink)

The polymath Michael Polanyi first made his mark as a physical chemist, but his interests gradually shifted to economics, politics, and philosophy, in which field he would ultimately propose a revolutionary theory of knowledge that grew out of his firsthand experience with both the scientific method and political totalitarianism. In this sixth entry in ISI Books’ Library of Modern Thinkers’ series, Mark T. Mitchell reveals how Polanyi came to recognize that the roots of the modern political and spiritual (...) crisis lay in an errant conception of knowledge that served to foreclose any possibility of making meaningful statements about truth, goodness, or beauty. Polanyi’s theory of knowledge as ineluctably personal but also grounded in reality is not merely of historical interest, writes Mitchell, for it proposes an attractive alternative for anyone who would reject both the hubris of modern rationalism and the ultimately nihilistic implications of academic postmodernism. (shrink)

Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.

Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology or 'institutional facts.'.

Since the time of Hume, many philosophers have thought it impossible to deduce an ‘Ought’ from an ‘Is,’ or in general to deduce ‘ethical sentences’ from purely ‘factual sentences.’ This is the thesis of the logical autonomy of ethics. I consider a more recent argument by Toomas Karmo in support of the autonomism, but show its limitations in the context of justification skepticism about ethics.

The Clarke/Rowe version of the Cosmological Argument is sound only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true, but many philosophers, including Rowe, think that there is not adequate evidence for the principle of sufficient reason. I argue that there may be indirect evidence for PSR on the grounds that if we do not accept it, we lose our best justification for an important principle of metaethics, namely, the Principle of Universalizability. To show this, I argue that all the other (...) justifications of the Principle of Universalizability on offer, including Richard Hare's, are inadequate. (shrink)

This article is not intended to state what I positively believe to be true, but to make a suggestion which I think it well-worth working out. The suggestion is not altogether unfamiliar, but it has certain implications that seem to have been so far overlooked, or at any rate have never been developed. I do not think that it is the duty of a philosopher to confine himself in his publications to working out theories of the truth of which he (...) is convinced.… It is a part of a philosopher's work, as it is of a scientist's, to try out tentative hypotheses and examine their advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.

I begin by asking the meta-epistemological question, 'What is justification?', analogous to the meta-ethical question, 'What is rightness?' I introduce the possibility of non-cognitivist, naturalist, non-naturalist, and eliminativist answers in meta-epistemology,corresponding to those in meta-ethics. I devote special attention to the naturalistic hypothesis that epistemic justification is identical to probability, showing its antecedent plausibility. I argue that despite this plausibility, justification cannot be identical with probability, under the standard interpretation of the probability calculus, for the simple reason that justification can (...) increase indefinitely but probability cannot. I then propose an alternative model for prima facie justification, based on an analogy with Ross's account of prima facie obligation, arguing that this model illuminates the differences between justification and probability and, given the plausible assumption of epistemic pluralism, explains them as well. (shrink)

There is a world-wide shortage of kidneys for transplantation. Many people will have to endure lengthy and unpleasant dialysis treatments, or die before an organ becomes available. Given this chronic shortage, some doctors and health economists have proposed offering financial incentives to potential donors to increase the supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, I explore objections to the practice of buying and selling organs from the point of view 1) justice, 2) beneficence and 3) Commodification. Regarding objection to the (...) Commodification of transplant organs, I examine a number of possible justifications of this objection but conclude that each of these would, if true, rule out the donation of transplant organs or the selling of numerous accepted commodities, or is implausible for some other reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Byrnes and FurtonMark T. Brown, Ph.D.In “Moral Complicity in Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research” (MCIPS) (Brown 2009), I sketched the moral complicity implications of alternative national stem cell policies with respect to direct reprogramming techniques that appear to result in pluripotent stem cells derived from skin cells, hair cells, and possibly other somatic cells. This aspect of the stem cell debate was considered from the perspective of (...) those who are pro embryo life and who attribute to human embryos a complete set of basic human rights, including a stringent right to life; and from the perspective of advocates of embryonic stem cell research who do not recognize full moral equivalence between human embryos and human children and who do not ascribe to human embryos an inviolable right to life. The moral complicity concerns of embryonic stem cell research advocates focus upon the scope of medical beneficence with respect to patients whose quality of life and personal autonomy are negatively impacted by the interval between the time when they might have gotten effective medical treatment through unimpeded stem cell science and the time at which stem cell science constrained by pro embryo life moral complicity concerns arrives at a similar destination. The moral complicity concerns of embryo life proponents focus upon noncooperation in past and future destruction of human embryos in order to derive in vitro embryonic stem cell lines.Among the policy alternatives considered were proposals that would be responsive to the possibility that induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC) at some point may provide a source of stem cell lines that would substitute for human embryonic stem [End Page 206] cell (hESC) lines in cell replacement therapy. If functional equivalence between iPSC lines and hESC lines for cell replacement purposes were confirmed, a national stem cell research policy might be crafted that could accommodate the central moral complicity concerns both of persons who are embryo life advocates and of advocates of embryonic stem cell research. Policy alternatives considered in MCIPS included those based upon the assumption that currently existing embryonic stem cell lines are sufficient to conduct iPSC/hESC functional equivalence studies and policy options based upon the assumption that currently existing hESC lines fall short of what would be required for methodologically sound validation studies. The moral complicity implications for those who are embryo life advocates of both sets of policies were outlined, as were the moral complicity implications of alternative policies for embryonic stem cell research advocates. Since moral complicity concerns are one factor that those who formulate national stem cell policy should consider, MCIPS was an attempt to provide some guidance to policymakers with respect to how alternative policies accommodate or fail to accommodate the moral complicity concerns of various constituencies.In a 2008 article, Malcolm Byrnes (2008, p. 286) appears to consider both empirical assumptions regarding the sufficiency of existing stem cell lines for meaningful functional equivalence studies, and for that reason I drew upon his paper to frame the moral complicity implications for advocates of embryo life of national stem cell policy based upon either assumption. In his paper, Byrnes refers both to stem cell scientists who “suggest” that the hESC lines approved by President Bush in 2001 are sufficient and to stem cell scientists who believe that more hESC lines are needed. Based on my reading of his paper, I erroneously included Byrnes in the group who were willing to consider new hESC derivations in order to complete functional equivalence studies. However, my description of the moral complicity implications for advocates of embryo life of policies that enable new hESC derivations was an exercise in contingency planning, and certainly not intended as “a condemnation” of Byrnes (2009, p. 203). Similarly, what Byrnes (2009, p. 204) sees as “ironic” is simply a description later in my paper of policy options based upon an alternative factual assumption.Byrnes’s position seems to be that existing hESC lines are sufficient to conduct iPSC/hESC functional equivalence studies and that no additional hESC lines should be derived. Although it appears that I did mischaracterize Byrnes’s view of the permissibility of deriving additional hESC lines for equivalence studies, I think my interpretation was... (shrink)

This paper details methods for teaching a topic-based approach to an introductory philosophy course. The problem with course surveys is that they sacrifice depth because of their fast pace, which often leaves students behind. Students are unable to grasp the scope of survey courses and only high functioning students appear to benefit from the structure. The single topic method can serve as a point of entry to the history of philosophy and students can gain a more intimate relationship with the (...) material. The author outlines the benefits of teaching a topic-based course centered on the problem of evil. The course allows students to immediately gain an intimacy with the material because it has intellectual and emotional connections to their lives. This approach to philosophy on a personal level also allows students to branch out into larger philosophical issues, such as justice, epistemology, politics, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Over a century’s worth of research suggests that “perception” without awareness is a genuine phenomenon. However, relatively little research has explored the question of whether all visually presented information activates representations in long term memory without awareness. Two experiments explored the use of a figure–ground display consisting of competing views in which one view dominates the other such that subjects are unaware of the non-dominant view. Neither experiment provided evidence that the non-dominant view activated its representation in long term memory (...) when the subject failed to report being aware of the embedded word in that priming was not seen on a subsequent stem completion task. In contrast, priming was seen when subjects reported being aware of the embedded word. It is suggested that two competing figure–ground relations are not concurrently computed unconsciously. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 35, Issue 7, Page 672-679, September 2021.